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1 Introduction
Illegal migration is a very controversial topic, with the illegal migrants flows
expected to become increasingly important during the course of the 21st
century. Images of "fortress Europe", with hordes of impoverished people
coming from Africa and knocking at the gates, form the basis upon which
many right-wing European politicians base their legitimacy. Despite the
scope of illegal migration between Africa and Europe, the determinants of this
phenomenon have not been studied to any significant extent. The major part
of the literature is related to illegal migration between Mexico and the U.S.
For instance, such studies show that illegal migrant flows are determined by
economic conditions and more specifically by large wage differentials between
these two countries (Hanson, 2006; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005; Hanson and
Spilimbergo, 1999) or the presence of migrant networks (Dolfin and Genicot,
2010).
This paper aims to go beyond traditional determinants of migration such
as expectations or networks and study how risk and time preferences influ-
ence illegal migration intentions and the willingness to pay (WTP) a smuggler
in an African context. In order to examine the role of preferences on ille-
gal migration intentions, we conducted a survey involving 400 individuals in
Dakar between November 2006 and April 2007. We chose Senegal for this
study because this country has been severely affected by illegal migration.
As far as we know, no comparable survey has been realized, thus rendering
our study unique. During the survey, we collected information about the
socio-demographic characteristics of people, their intentions and attitudes
about illegal migration and their WTP a smuggler in order to attempt illegal
migration.
Given our interest in the role of preferences in the willingness to migrate
illegally and more specifically in the WTP a smuggler with a probability
one of success, we draw on literature of the determinants of the WTP and
the role of risk and time preferences on agents’ decision-making. The WTP
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concept is generally used in contingent valuation methods in order to eval-
uate the monetary value of a non-market good. These concepts have been
largely studied in many areas such as environment (see for instance Hane-
mann, 1994; Whittington et al., 1990; Verbic and Slabe-Erker, 2009), health
economics (see for instance Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2009; Protière et al.,
2004; Nguessan, 2008; Dror et al., 2007) or infrastructures (Torero et al.,
2003). Furthermore, the determinants of the WTP have also been studied in
the field of migration. For instance, Sengupta and Hedge (2005) study the
determinants of the WTP among undocumented agricultural workers from
Mexico for gaining legal visas in rural Southern California. They find that
this WTP is determined by the perception that the legal status is associated
with both a higher wage and a reduction of the unemployment period at the
beginning of the migration to the U.S. From the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIM), Guiso and Paiella (2004) find that
risk aversion plays an important role in household decisions related to their
choice of occupation, portfolio selection, investment in education, job moving
decisions and exposure to chronic diseases. In the case of migration, Daveri
and Faini (1999) use aggregate panel data from Southern Italy, finding that
risk-aversion is a strong determinant of internal and international migration.
Heitmueller (2005) argues that being risk-averse reduces the likelihood of
migrating relative to being risk neutral. Moreover, risk-averse people are
more likely to go to countries with high unemployment benefits because they
reduce the volatility of expected payoffs of migration, whereas risk-loving
people will choose countries with a high degree of income volatility, which
consequently increases their utility. These results are confirmed by Nowotny
(2010), who finds that being risk averse reduces the willingness to migrate
and to commute, whereas a higher discount rate is associated with a higher
intention to migrate.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to be interested,
both theoretically and empirically, in the role of risk and time preferences on
2
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illegal migration intention and the WTP a smuggler in an African context,
where very little research has been undertaken concerning this phenomenon.
In the case of our study, we interpret the WTP a smuggler with a prob-
ability one of success as the perception of the payoff associated with a safe
arrival in the destination country without being apprehended. During the
survey, we ask people direct questions to elicit information about their WTP
a smuggler, their degree of aversion to risk and their subjective rate of time
preference. Our approach is similar to Barsky et al., (1997), who ask direct
questions that involve choice in hypothetical situations, from an experimen-
tal approach with participants in the Health and Retirement Study. Their
measure of risk aversion is obtained with answers concerning the willingness
of people to gamble on lifetime income and their measure of intertemporal
substitution, and time preferences are obtained by asking people to choose
consumption profiles implicitly associated with different rates of return. In
this study, we first use a theoretical model to study how preferences affect
the illegal migration intention and the WTP a smuggler with a probability
one of success. Subsequently, we theoretically define two expressions of time
and risk preferences through the individual’s intertemporal discount rate and
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. We later compute a mean value of the
discount rate and the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion with an associated
standard deviation for each individual. Finally, we use a Heckman procedure
to empirically test our theoretical predictions, because the WTP a smuggler
with a probability one of success is only observed for the sample of potential
illegal migrants.
Our results can be summarized as follows: first, the likelihood of an in-
dividual choosing illegal over legal migration is an increasing function of the
intertemporal discount rate under some conditions, an ambiguous function
of risk-aversion, an increasing function of the expected foreign wage and a
decreasing function of the price of illegal migration. Second, the price that an
individual is willing to pay a smuggler for an illegal migration attempt with
3
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a probability one of success is an increasing function of the intertemporal
discount rate, a decreasing function of risk-aversion, an increasing function
of the expected foreign wage, an ambiguous function of the domestic wage
and an increasing function of the lump sum payment necessary to induce
an individual not to leave Senegal. This paper shows that in addition to
determinants of migration such as the expected foreign wage, networks, im-
migration policies or migration prices, individual preferences matter in the
formation of an illegal migration project and can explain the risky behavior
of candidates regarding illegal migration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section
presents a model of the illegal migration intention and the WTP a smuggler
with a probability one of success. In Section 3, we theoretically evaluate the
expressions of the individual’s intertemporal discount rate and coefficient of
absolute risk aversion calculated in order to make our estimations. Section
4 presents the data and the descriptive statistics obtained from our survey,
before the estimation strategy and empirical results are discussed in Section
5. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
2 Migration intention and the willingness to
pay
2.1 Migration intention
Let the monthly wage in Senegal be denoted by w, and the expected wage
in the destination country by w∗. We consider that the timing of migration
takes place at time zero. At this moment, we assume that both potential legal
and illegal migrants have taken the final decision of migration. At time zero,
potential legal migrants have the level of skills required and their decision to
migrate is definitive. Their migration attempt is not a "wait and see" option.
For illegal migrants, the credit constraint is released at time zero and they
4
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get the necessary funds to finance their migration. The one-shot price of
reaching the destination will be denoted by C, with associated probability of
success p. Illegal migrants do not immediately make another attempt if they
are apprehended and sent back home. It is very likely to assume that if they
want to make another attempt, they need to find new financial resources that
can take much time and make another attempt unrealizable at time 0.
Consider a simple present discounted value (PDV) calculation, in which t
represents the current age of the individual, T the retirement age, and ρ
the discount rate. Preferences are assumed to be represented by a utility
function denoted by u(.). There is no role for return migration. Subsequently,
the intertemporal welfare associated with an unsuccessful attempt of leaving
Senegal at time 0 , and therefore remaining there from time 0 until retirement
at age T , while earning a constant monthly wage w is given by:
V UE = u (w − C) + u (w)
τ=T−t∑
τ=1
1
(1 + ρ)τ
= u (w − C) + u (w)
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
,
(1)
(where the superscript UE stands for unsuccessful emigration). Conversely,
we assume that the attempt at emigrating is successful, costs C and results in
earning the foreign wage w∗ starting at τ = 1. This yields an intertemporal
welfare given by:
V SE = u (w − C) + u (w∗)
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
, (2)
(where the superscript SE stands for successful emigration). In what follows,
we will refer to 1−(1+ρ)
t−T
ρ
as the individual’s "intertemporal discount rate".
The expected value of the attempt at emigration is therefore given by E [V ] =
pV SE + (1− p)V UE. Substituting from (1) and (2) yields:
E [V ] = u (w − C) + [pu (w∗) + (1− p) u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
. (3)
5
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Let the intertemporal welfare associated with remaining in Senegal and earn-
ing a wage w from t = 0 to t = T be given by:
V = u (w)
(1 + ρ)− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
(4)
An individual will attempt to emigrate when E [V ] > V , which can be
written, by substituting from (3) and (4) and simplifying the ensuing expres-
sion, as:
u (w − C)− u (w) + p [u (w∗)− u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
> 0. (5)
The preceding model is extremely reminiscent of the standard approaches
of Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970).
What is the difference between legal and illegal migration in terms of the
theoretical model? During the survey, we ask the questions: (1) are you
willing to migrate? (2) If you are not able to migrate legally, are you willing
to migrate illegally? We phrase the question in this way because we consider
that if people have a high probability of succeeding with legal migration, they
will attempt it. However, most people would perceive that the likelihood of
succeeding in legal migration out of Senegal is significantly lower than the
probability of success through illegal migration. Individuals will attempt ille-
gal migration if they do not have any other legal possibility or if they assume
that they have no chance of success in a legal migration due to their level of
education and/or social condition. A second characteristic of legal migration
is that the associated administrative costs are very low (usually amount-
ing to the cost of the visa application and the accompanying documents that
must be submitted), although the airfare to the potential destination country
does increase the overall price, particularly when compared with the prices
of illegal migration methods.
If we allow the expression given in (3) to represent the case of illegal
6
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migration, where the expected wage in the destination country in such a case
is denoted by w∗, and carry out a similar PDV calculation for legal migration,
where the probability of success is denoted by q < p , the price is denoted
by K , and the expected wage is denoted by w∗ > w∗, we obtain:
E
[
V illegal
]
= u (w − C) + [pu (w∗) + (1− p) u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
,
E
[
V legal
]
= u (w −K) + [qu (w∗) + (1− q) u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
.
The individual will prefer illegal over legal migration when E
[
V illegal
]
>
E
[
V legal
]
, which can be written explicitly as:
u (w − C)−u (w −K)+[pu (w∗)− qu (w∗)− (p− q) u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
> 0.
(6)
Consider the two following second-order Taylor expansions:
u (w − C) ≈ u(w)− Cu′(w) +
C2
2
u′′(w),
u (w −K) ≈ u(w)−Ku′(w) +
K2
2
u′′(w).
Subsequently, one can rewrite (6) as:
(K − C) u′(w)
[
1 +
1
2
(C +K)
(
−
u′′(w)
u′(w)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(w−C)−u(w−K)
+
[pu (w∗)− qu (w∗)− (p− q) u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
> 0. (7)
One can immediately establish the following Proposition by straightfor-
7
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ward differentiation of (7):
Proposition 1 The likelihood that an individual chooses illegal over legal
emigration is: (i) an increasing function of the intertemporal discount rate
1−(1+ρ)t−T
ρ
when pu(w
∗)−qu(w∗)
p−q
> u (w), (ii) an increasing function of the ex-
pected illegal migration foreign wage, (iii) a decreasing function of the ex-
pected legal migration foreign wage, (iv) a decreasing function of the price
of illegal migration, (v) an increasing (decreasing) function of risk-aversion
when K − C > (<) 0.
2.2 The Willingness to pay a smuggler
We consider the WTP a smuggler with a probability of success equal to one,
which we denote by C∗. This WTP is implicitly defined by the solution in
C∗ to the following equation:1
u (w − C∗)− u (w) + [u (w∗)− u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
= 0.
By the same second-order Taylor expansion as above, this can be rewritten
as:
[u (w∗)− u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
−
[
u′(w)C∗ −
C∗2
2
u′′(w)
]
= 0,
or
[u (w∗)− u (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
− u′(w)
[
C∗ +
C∗2
2
(
−
u′′(w)
u′(w)
)]
= 0. (8)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, one can immediately establish the fol-
lowing Proposition:
Proposition 2 The price that an individual is willing to pay a smuggler for
an illegal immigration attempt with probability 1 of success is: (i) an increas-
1For simplicity, we revert to the earlier notation in which the foreign wage rate in the
case of illegal migration is given by w∗ = w∗.
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ing function of the intertemporal discount rate 1−(1+ρ)
t−T
ρ
, (ii) an increasing
function of the expected foreign wage, (iii) an ambiguous function of the do-
mestic wage, (iv) a decreasing function of risk-aversion.
Proof. See the Appendix for details.
The only ambiguity in the WTP a smuggler for an illegal immigration
attempt with probability one of success is associated with the effect of the
domestic wage. All other comparative statics results for our model are clear-
cut, including the effect of risk-aversion.
3 Inferring preferences
Let the lump sum payment necessary to induce an individual not to
leave Senegal be denoted by D. Therefore, indifference between remaining
in Senegal and receiving the lump sum payment D at τ = 0 (with associ-
ated intertemporal welfare V LS = u (w +D) + u (w) 1−(1+ρ)
t−T
ρ
, where the
superscript LS stands for lump sum), and the expected value of an attempt
at emigration with cost Cj and probability of success pj (with associated
intertemporal welfare E [V ]) yields 0 = E [V ]−V LS, which can be expressed
more explicitly as:
0 = u (w − Cj) + [pju (w
∗)− pju (w)]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
− u (w +D) . (9)
The reason for indexing the pair (Cj, pj) by j will become apparent in what
follows. If retirement age is considered indefinitely far away by individuals
(T → ∞) and individuals are risk neutral (u (w) = w) then (9) simplifies
to D =
pj(w
∗
−w)
ρ
− Cj. Given the appropriate data, which includes various
values of the cost Cj that individuals are willing to bear in order to achieve
migration success with a given known probability pj, equation (9) allows
9
Etudes et Documents no 2013.16, CERDI, 2013
recovering both the discount rate ρ and risk aversion in the context of the
emigration decision. We show this in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If the individual is willing to emigrate at cost Cj (Ck) with
associated probability of success pj (pk), and is willing to forego emigration
in return for a lump-sum payment D, then:
(i) the individual’s coefficient of absolute risk-aversion is given by
A(w) = 2
pj (Ck +D)− pk (Cj +D)
pj (D2 − C2k)− pk
(
D2 − C2j
) ;
(ii) the individual’s intertemporal discount rate is defined by
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
=
(Cj +D) (Ck +D) (Ck − Cj)
∆w∗ [pj (Ck +D) (Ck +∆w∗ −D)− pk (Cj +D) (Cj +∆w∗ −D)]
.
Proof. The proof follows from a second-order Taylor expansion of (9), and
noticing that the ensuing expression holds for any two gambles (Cj, pj) and
(Ck, pk). See the Appendix for details.
For each individual, we have five gambles (Cj, pj). Therefore, there are
(4+3+2+1) possible versions of the two expressions given in Proposition
3. For each individual, we can thus compute a mean value of A(w) and
1−(1+ρ)t−T
ρ
, with an associated standard deviation.
4 Data and estimates of preferences
4.1 Data
Since there was no data available on the motivations, risk and time prefer-
ences of illegal migrants from Africa, we collected new data on potential mi-
grants from Senegal. We conducted a field survey in Dakar between Novem-
ber 2006 and April 2007. Questions were related to the socio-demographic
10
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characteristics of the individuals, their willingness to migrate and more specif-
ically their willingness to migrate illegally, the destinations to which they
would like to migrate and their WTP a smuggler. Our aim with this survey
was to reach individuals with a possible willingness to migrate and conduct
the analysis by comparing potential legal migrants and potential illegal mi-
grants. Therefore, our reference population is people who are willing to
migrate. We first define Dakar as the analyzed unit for its accessibility and
above all the variety of its population. Second, we picked several neighbor-
hoods2, within which we surveyed 400 individuals. 92% of our total sample
are potential migrants, thus reaching our aim of having a population of poten-
tial migrants. Among them, 367 individuals want to migrate, 222 of whom
only want to migrate legally and 145 are ready to migrate illegally, which
represents 40% of potential migrants.
4.2 Survey experiment and descriptive statistics
In order to compute the individual’s intertemporal discount rate and the
coefficient of absolute risk aversion expressed in proposition 3, we ask people
direct questions about their expected wage abroad, their wage in Senegal,
their lump-sum payment to not leave Senegal and their WTP associated
with different probabilities of success. More specifically, we prompt them to
consider hypothetical situations and ask how much they are willing to pay
according to different probabilities of an illegal migration attempt succeeding.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the WTP a smuggler as-
sociated with different probabilities of success for those who are willing to
migrate illegally. We observe that the lower the probability of success, the
2These neighborhoods are the University Campus and its surroundings (1); Fass, Med-
ina and Geule-Tapée (2); Guediawaye (3); Sandaga (4); Kayar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yoff
(5).
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lower the share of individuals who are willing to migrate illegally. However,
this proportion remains high compared to the risk taken. Indeed, with a
5% probability of success, 53% of people are still willing to migrate illegally.
Moreover, the difference between their WTP with a probability of success of
one and a probability of success of 0.05 is quite low, estimated at only 216,356
Fcfa, i.e. 330 Euros. While these amounts are high in the case of Senegal,
they are an indication of the high level of frustration of people that consider
migration, even if it is an illegal project, as the only way to improve their
bad living conditions or to succeed. Moreover, these figures are very realistic,
suggesting that migrants are well informed about different prices in the ille-
gal migration market. Thus, it is likely that if they finance their migration
through a loan, for instance, they plan to repay the smuggler with their first
wage earned in the host country. The average lump sum payment necessary
to induce an individual not to leave Senegal (D) is equal to 1.76e+09 Fcfa
(2,683, 090 Euros). This high amount indicates the large utility gap of poten-
tial migrants between migrating and remaining in Senegal. We calculate the
average individual’s intertemporal discount rate and coefficients of absolute
risk aversion from proposition 3 of the theoretical model.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
The average individual’s intertemporal discount rate is equal to 0.91 for
potential illegal migrants. When more specifically considering the distribu-
tion of this variable (Figure 1), 64% of potential migrants have an intertem-
poral discount rate above 0 and 28% have an intertemporal discount rate
above 0.8.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2 shows the histogram of the mean value of the individual’s co-
efficient of absolute risk aversion A(w). We observe that the individual’s
coefficients of absolute risk aversion are very close to 0, which means that
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the individuals are risk neutral. They do not care about their risks taken
with illegal migration, which is a strong signal of their determination. In
order to achieve more variability than the mean value of individual’s coef-
ficients of absolute risk aversion A(w) , we create a dummy equal to one if
potential illegal migrants are risk-averse (the mean value of individual’s coef-
ficients of absolute risk aversion is positive) and 0 if they are risk-loving (the
mean value of individual’s coefficients of absolute risk aversion is negative).
Accordingly, this dummy is used in the estimations.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 2 summarizes the other descriptive statistics. The average expected
wage of a potential migrant is 1,567,466 Fcfa per month, i.e. 2,390 Euros,
whereas the average monthly wage in Senegal (approximated by monthly
expenditure) is estimated at 76,055 Fcfa, i.e. 116 Euros. The monthly ex-
penditure is used as a proxy for the wage in Senegal, because people answer
more easily about their expenditure, which renders this variable more reliable
than income. The average migration price is 2,220,254 Fcfa (3,385 Euros).
42% of potential migrants have a low level of education, and this proportion
decreases gradually with secondary and university levels of education.
5 Econometric analysis and results
5.1 Estimation strategy
This section aims to empirically test our theoretical predictions. However,
given that the individual preferences variables are only available for the po-
tential illegal migrants, we are unable to test the theoretical predictions of
the effect of these variables on the illegal migration intention, but rather only
on the WTP a smuggler. Individuals will only pay a smuggler if they are
willing to migrate illegally. Therefore, the WTP is observed for the part of
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the sample willing to migrate illegally. In this case, we do not have a random
selection. In order to avoid a selection bias and specification error, we use
a Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979). We estimate the selection equation
by a probit model and the outcome equation by a linear model, giving us:
Outcome equation: yi = xiβ + wiγ + λiη + αr + εi (10)
Selection equation: mi =
{
1 if xiβ + ziθ + αr + µi > 0
0 if xiβ + ziθ + αr + µi ≤ 0
(11)
Where:
yi is observed only when mi = 1
εi ∼ N(0, σ)
µi ∼ N(0, 1)
corr(εi, µi) = υ
In equation (10), yi represents the logarithm of the WTP a smuggler
with a probability one of success. (wi) is the vector of interest variables.
(wi) includes the mean value of the individual’s intertemporal discount rates
represented by 1−(1+ρ)
t−T
ρ
and a dummy equal to one if the individual is risk-
averse. These values are calculated from the proposition 3 in the theoretical
model and γ is the vector of parameters to be estimated. xi is the vector
of control variables, including those considered as triggering factors of illegal
migration such as the logarithm of the foreign expected wage per capita, the
logarithm of migration prices, immigration policies measured by a dummy
equal to one if individuals do not renounce to migrate in the case of restric-
tive immigration policies, a dummy equal to one if individuals have family or
friends’ relatives who have migrated. This variable allows us to take network
effects into account. xi also includes the socio-demographic characteristics
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such as the logarithm of the monthly wage in Senegal per capita3, gender,
age and its square, marital status, dummy equal to one if the individual has
a male dependent child, home occupation status (dummy equal to one if the
individual and family live in their own home), a dummy to control for those
who belong to the religious brotherhood Mouride, known for their networks
abroad and indicator variables for ethnic groups. β is the vector of parame-
ters to be estimated. In order to capture unobserved regional characteristics,
we control equation (10) for five neighborhood dummies (αr).
In the selection equation (equation 11), mi is the binary variable equal to one
if the individual reports a possibility for illegal migration and 0 otherwise, xi
is the same vector of control variables included in the outcome equation and
zi is the exclusion variable represented by different levels of education. We
assume that the level of education influences the intention to migrate illegally
but not the WTP a smuggler with a probability one of success, given that
expected returns from skills for an illegal migration are very low. First, this
is due to illegal migrants generally being less skilled than legal migrants. It
is shown in the literature that people tend to invest less in education due
to the perspective of future migration (Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2011) and
more specifically illegal migrants have a lower incentive to acquire human
capital due to a higher risk of apprehension (Chiswick, 1999). Moreover, il-
legal migrants are paid less than legal migrants due to their shorter expected
duration in the destination and the limitations of their job mobility (Kos-
soudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; Rivera-Batiz, 1999). For instance, Rivera-Batiz
(1999) shows that even if illegal migrants are less educated, achieve worse
language proficiency and have a shorter period of residence in the U.S. than
legal migrants, the gap between the earnings of illegal and legal migrants is
3The monthly wage in Senegal per capita is approximated by the average monthly
expenditures. We divided the average monthly expenditures of the individuals by 1+
the number of dependents and also the foreign expected wage by 1 + the number of
dependents to take into account the burden of responsibilities that may influence the
method of migration.
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predominantly explained by the illegal status of undocumented workers who
are exploited by their employers. Illegal migrants generally used to work in
low-paid jobs (Taylor, 1992) where their qualifications, if they exist, are not
fully expoited due to their illegal status.
5.2 Results
[TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 reports the results of the Heckman procedure, showing that the
willingness to migrate illegally is an increasing function of the foreign ex-
pected wage (Column 1), which is particularly true in the case of illegal
migration. The expected wage value can often be evaluated in terms of what
potential migrants think about the salaries of their relatives who have already
migrated, which is confirmed by the results of the variable relatives abroad.
Indeed, we find that having family and friends’ relatives who have already mi-
grated significantly increases the likelihood of migrating illegally. There is a
negative relationship between migration prices and the likelihood to migrate
illegally, which also confirms our theoretical predictions. The main reason is
that illegal migration is an expensive project that requires significant funds.4
Moreover, these amounts often involve taking loans or years of savings to
finance migration. The result of the level of education, which represents our
exclusion variable, shows that having a university level of education strongly
reduces the likelihood of migrating illegally compared to having a low level of
education. This variable is negative and significant at a level of 1%. One of
the explanation of this result is that educated and skilled people have better
living conditions and a higher likelihood of obtaining legitimate documents
for legal migration.
The results of the outcome equation are reported in Column 2 of Table 3.
4More generally, even legal migration migration costs such as passport fees are corre-
lated with lower migration rates (Mckenzie, 2007) and prices for illegal migration used to
be higher than for legal migration.
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Our empirical findings confirm our theoretical propositions, finding that the
average individual’s intertemporal discount rate is significantly and positively
related to the WTP a smuggler with a probability one of success. If the in-
dividual’s preference for the present is higher, the potential illegal migrant
has a higher WTP a smuggler with a probability one of success. A legal
procedure can take much time and many attempts without any guarantee of
success. Consequently, individuals who are willing to engage in illegal mi-
gration are also willing to pay a smuggler more to immediately improve their
living conditions. The risk aversion dummy is significant and reduces the
WTP a smuggler, given that paying a smuggler induces de facto a financial
risk associated with the nature of the project that only the most determined
can take. Moreover, the behavior of these less risk-averse individuals can re-
flect a sort of signal for the smugglers to determine the most risky "clients"
and raise their prices for this category of people.5 The higher the expecta-
tions, the higher the amount that people will be willing to pay to guarantee
them a successful migration. However, the wage earned in Senegal does not
appear to be significant, which confirms the ambiguous function of this vari-
able in our theoretical predictions. The migration prices become insignificant
at the second step, which shows that once they are willing to migrate ille-
gally, potential migrants are strongly motivated and the migration prices no
longer constitute a constraint in their WTP a smuggler. The Inverse Mills
Ratio is not significant, which means that there is no selection bias.6
5According to Pratt (1964) the risk premium is a positive monotonic function of the risk
aversion. However in some cases, the WTP may negatively be related to the degree of risk
aversion. A risk-neutral individual can have a higher willingness to pay than a risk-averse
individual for a partial reduction of risk (Eeckhoudt et al., 1997; Langlais, 2005)
6The observations are 332 instead of 367 because of missing values due first to the
expected foreign wage and the wage in Senegal, (even if we take the monthly expenditures
as proxy of this variable that already allows us to decrease the number of missing values).
Second, it is due to indetermined intertemporal discount rates and coefficients of absolute
risk aversion for some individuals who decide to not migrate from a certain probability of
success lower than one. For these people we cannot form all the gambles (Cj , pj) necessary
to calculate the variables of preferences.
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Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the estimations with the lump sum
payment necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal as the variable
of interest. The lump sum payment is also a measure of the individual
preferences because it captures the monetary value given to migration and
provides an indication of the utility gap between migrating and remaining in
Senegal. The lump sum payment is not significant at the first step, which
means that is does not affect the likelihood to migrate illegally rather than
legally. However, there is a positive relationship between the lump sum
payment and potential migrants’ WTP a smuggler. This result means that
the higher value that potential illegal migrants place upon migration, the
more they are willing to pay a smuggler in order to succeed in their illegal
migration project.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper aims to show the role of time and risk preferences in the willing-
ness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler. From a theoretical model,
we study how these variables affect the willingness to migrate illegally and
to pay a smuggler with a probability one of success. We also define theoret-
ically two expressions of time and risk preferences used in our estimations.
What further makes our paper original is that we use an original data set
from a survey among potential migrants in Senegal to test our theoretical
predictions.
Our comparative statistics show that, first, the likelihood to migrate il-
legally is an increasing function of the intertemporal discount rate under
certain conditions, an ambiguous function of the risk aversion, an increasing
function of the expected illegal foreign wage, a decreasing function of the
expected legal foreign wage and a decreasing function of the price of illegal
migration. Second, the price that an individual is willing to pay a smuggler
for an illegal immigration attempt with probability one of success is an in-
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creasing function of the intertemporal discount rate, a decreasing function
of risk-aversion, an increasing function of the expected foreign wage, an am-
biguous function of the domestic wage. We were able to empirically test
all our theoretical predictions apart from the effect of the intertemporal dis-
count rate and the risk aversion on the willingness to migrate illegally, due to
the non-availability of data for potential legal migrants. All other theoretical
predictions are confirmed by the empirical estimations. The empirical results
also show that the WTP a smuggler is an increasing function of the lump sum
payment necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal, which means
that potential illegal migrants place a high monetary value upon migration
and have a high utility gap between migrating and remaining in Senegal.
In addition to the determinants of migration such as the expectations, pres-
ence of relatives in the destination country, immigration policies or migration
prices, we find that individual preferences matter in the illegal migration. Ac-
cordingly, they have to be considered in the explanation of illegal migration
and also in the probable inefficiency of immigration policies that do not nec-
essarily take into account the sense of determination and "emergency" that
potential illegal migrants have in improving their living conditions.
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Table 1: Probabilities of success and willingness to pay a smuggler of poten-
tial illegal migrants
Mean Sd Obs
How much are you willing to pay if p = 1? 1,480,556 2,004,192 145
If p = 0.75, are you willing to migrate? 0.85 0.36 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay? 1,351,829 1,952,752 123
If p = 0.50, are you willing to migrate? 0.77 0.43 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay? 1,311,261 1,994,398 111
If p= 0.25, are you willing to migrate? 0.62 0.49 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay ? 1,315,611 1,792,507 90
If p = 0.05, are you willing to migrate? 0.53 0.50 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay? 1,264,200 1,592,63 75
Note: 1 Euro=655.96 Fcfa
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variables Mean SD Obs
Migrate illegally 0.40 0.49 367
Willingness to pay 1,480,556 2,004,192 144
Average discount rate 0.91 3.32 138
Risk aversion 0.92 0.27 138
Lump sum payment 1.76e+09 2.34e+10 294
Expected foreign wage 1,567,466 5,486,186 363
Expected foreign wage per capita 893,918 5,332,343 363
wage 76,054.93 64,698.93 343
Wage per capita 21,481.92 16,979.35 343
Restrictive immigration policies 0.68 0.47 367
Relatives abroad 0.74 0.44 367
Migration prices 2,220,254 1,756,592 367
Male 0.88 0.33 367
Age 25.96 07.18 367
Married 0.26 0.44 367
Child is male 0.84 0.37 367
Low education level 0.42 0.49 367
Secondary level 0.27 0.44 367
University level 0.16 0.37 367
Koranic school 0.15 0.36 367
Home owner 0.56 0.50 367
Mouride 0.45 0.50 367
Wolof ethnic group 0.34 0.47 367
Lebou ethnic group 0.19 0.39 367
Hal Pular ethnic group 0.11 0.32 367
Serere ethnic group 0.23 0.42 367
Diola ethnic group 0.05 0.23 367
Manjack ethnic group 0.01 0.10 367
Bambara, Mandingue and Sub-region ethnic group 0.07 0.26 367
Region of Campus 0.11 0.32 367
Region of Fass, Medina and Geule tapée 0.11 0.31 367
Region of Guédiawaye 0.36 0.48 367
Region of Sandaga 0.12 0.33 367
Region of Kayar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yoff 0.30 0.46 367
Notes : Prices are in Fcfa. 1 Euro= 655.96 Fcfa.
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Table 3: Preferences and willingness to pay a smuggler: Heckman procedure
Variables Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average discount rate 0.080***
(3.14)
Risk aversion -1.049***
(2.94)
Log lump sum payment -0.012 0.153***
(0.22) (3.21)
Log expected foreign wage per capita 0.229** 0.174* 0.256*** 0.172*
(2.44) (1.89) (2.58) (1.77)
Log wage per capita -0.063 0.001 -0.036 -0.131
(0.45) (0.01) (0.24) (1.07)
Restrictive immigration policies 0.583*** -0.799*** 0.538** -0.621**
(2.64) (3.21) (2.25) (2.42)
Relatives abroad 0.621** 0.008 0.434 0.186
(2.28) (0.02) (1.48) (0.63)
Migration prices -1.016*** 0.320 -1.038*** 0.247
(8.64) (1.27) (8.17) (0.91)
Education level
Secondary level -0.166 -0.208
(0.73) (0.83)
University level -1.592*** -1.313**
(3.05) (2.28)
Koranic school -0.179 -0.139
(0.60) (0.44)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.471 -0.385
0.96 (0.71)
Observations 332 280
Notes:Robust z-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; signficant at
1%. The reference category for the education level is low education level. Individual characteristics
include gender, age and its square, a dummy equal to one if the individual has a male child
dependent, a dummy equal to one if the individual or his family lives in their own house. All
regressions include religious, ethnic and neighborhoods dummies.
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Figure 1: Individual’s intertemporal discount rate
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Figure 2: Individual’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion
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Proofs
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (8) yields:
dC∗
d
(
1−(1+ρ)t−T
ρ
) = − u (w∗)− u (w)
− [u′(w)− C∗u′′(w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0,
dC∗
dw∗
= −
u′ (w∗) 1−(1+ρ)
t−T
ρ
− [u′(w)− C∗u′′(w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0,
dC∗
dw
= −
−u′ (w) 1−(1+ρ)
t−T
ρ
−
[
u′′(w)C∗ − C
∗2
2
u′′′(w)
]
− [u′(w)− C∗u′′(w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≶ 0,
dC∗
d
(
−
u′′(w)
u′(w)
) = − −u′(w)C∗22
− [u′(w)− C∗u′′(w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0. [QED]
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Consider second-order Taylor expansions of the elements of (9): u (w − C) ≈
u(w) − Cu′(w) + C
2
2
u′′(w); u (w∗) = u (w +∆w∗) ≈ u(w) + ∆w∗u′(w) +
∆w∗2
2
u′′(w), u (w +D) ≈ u(w) + Du′(w) + D
2
2
u′′(w). Substitution into (9)
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then yields:
0 = u(w)− Cju
′(w) +
C2j
2
u′′(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(w−Cj)
+

pj
(
u(w) + ∆w∗u′(w) +
∆w∗2
2
u′′(w)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(w∗)
+ (1− pj) u (w)

 1− (1 + ρ)
t−T
ρ
−

u(w) +Du′(w) + D22 u′′(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(w+D)
+ u (w)
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ

 .
Dividing by u′(w) and letting A(w) = −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
allows one to simplify this
expression to:
0 = −Cj−
C2j
2
A(w)+pj∆w
∗
[
1−
∆w∗
2
A(w)
]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
−
[
D −
D2
2
A(w)
]
.
(12)
Now this indifference relationship holds for any gamble .(Cj, pj). It follows,
for gambles (Cj, pj) and (Ck, pk), that−Cj−
C2j
2
A(w)+pj∆w
∗
[
1− ∆w
∗
2
A(w)
]
1−(1+ρ)t−T
ρ
=
−Ck −
C2
k
2
A(w) + pk∆w
∗
[
1− ∆w
∗
2
A(w)
]
1−(1+ρ)t−T
ρ
, and thus that:
0 = Cj−Ck+
(
C2j
2
−
C2k
2
)
A(w)+(pk − pj)∆w
∗
[
1−
∆w∗
2
A(w)
]
1− (1 + ρ)t−T
ρ
.
(13)
Combining equations (12) and (13) then allows one to solve for the dis-
count rate ρ and the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion A(w) as given in the
Proposition. [QED]
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